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1. INTRODUCTION
James Freeman proposes to classify arguments on two dimensions. An argument is
“defeasible” if its warrant admits of exceptions, “conclusive” otherwise. It is “a
posteriori” if its warrant has to be backed by sense experience, “a priori” otherwise.
Freeman argues that all four theoretically possible combinations are actualized. In
particular, there are defeasible a priori arguments; the generalizations associated
with their warrants are synthetic a priori judgments of the sort recognized by Kant.
And there are conclusive a posteriori arguments, whose warrants are universal but
based on sense experience.
The point of Freeman’s classification is to provide a framework for assessing
what he calls, following Govier, the “ground adequacy” of an argument: whether its
supporting reasons, if they are acceptable, are jointly sufficient to justify acceptance
of its conclusion. Exceptions to an argument’s warrant undermine ground adequacy
if the argument is conclusive but not if it is defeasible. Analogously, attention to the
extent and variety of observations supporting an argument’s warrant is appropriate
for assessing ground adequacy if the argument is a posteriori, but not if it is a priori.
The classification scheme thus implies and reflects a pluralistic approach to
assessing ground adequacy.
2. TYPES OF WHAT?
There is much to agree with, and to reinforce, in Freeman’s proposal. But there is
one major respect in which the proposal is misdirected. Freeman is really classifying
ways in which reasons can provide adequate grounds for a claim—if you like, kinds
of ground adequacy. His taxonomy does not cover arguments in which the reasons
are inadequate. Further, arguments generally do not come with their warrant preidentified. The warrant must usually be elicited, with a question like “How does that
follow?” And in general more than one answer to that question is defensible. Hence,
we cannot classify arguments by their warrants. Further, arguments generally do
not carry on their face an indication of whether their reasons support their claim
conclusively or defeasibly.
One might be tempted, however, to use Freeman’s classification scheme, or
any taxonomy of ways a conclusion can follow from given reasons, to classify
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arguments indirectly, according to which standard of inference appraisal is
appropriate to the argument. This strategy lies behind standard textbook
classifications of arguments as either deductive or inductive, depending on whether
the author intends (or claims, or believes) the conclusion to follow necessarily or
merely with probability. Since arguers’ intentions of this sort are generally absent or
unavailable (as are the corresponding claims and beliefs), such taxonomies are
wrong-headed. Freeman’s proposed taxonomy laudably makes no appeal to the
intentions (or claims or beliefs) of arguers as to whether the reasons support their
claim conclusively or defeasibly, or as to whether the warrant is backed a priori or a
posteriori.
An alternative way of determining the appropriate standard of appraisal for
an argument would be to identify a scheme that it exemplifies that has an
appropriate standard of appraisal. Modus ponens and modus tollens arguments,
disjunctive and hypothetical syllogisms, and existential generalizations from
instances, for example, are clearly candidates for appraisal by the standard of formal
deductive validity, a species of conclusiveness. Arguments to the best explanation
are to be appraised by their distinctive criteria, whose complete satisfaction still
leaves them defeasible.
But this alternative way of classifying arguments by their appropriate
standard of appraisal will not work, for reasons that Freeman admirably articulates:
some commonly recognized forms of argument cut across the distinctions between
defeasible and conclusive warrants, and between a priori and a posteriori backing.
Freeman mentions conductive arguments, whose warrants are in some cases a
priori but in other cases a posteriori. I would add that in some cases the warrants of
such arguments are conclusive rather than defeasible, as when one argues from
satisfaction of the relevant criteria to a classification of a bird as a reptile. Similarly,
he argues that some arguments by analogy are defeasible a priori and others
defeasible a posteriori. Still others, I would add, are conclusive a posteriori, namely
those whose conclusion follows in virtue of an exceptionless but empirically
justified determination relation, such as the fact that the first letter of a Canadian
postal code determines the province in which an address is located. There might
even be conclusive a priori arguments by analogy.
The fact that some argument schemes cut across the conclusive-defeasible
distinction means that the project of using that distinction or variants of it as the
top-level distinction in a taxonomy of argument schemes will not produce a Linnean
tree-like hierarchy.
If one interprets Freeman’s taxonomy as a classification of types of ground
adequacy rather than of types of argument, then the lessons for argument appraisal
are somewhat different than the ones he draws. Rather than identifying an
argument’s warrant as conclusive or defeasible and then adopting the appropriate
attitude towards recognition of an exception, one should ask whether the argument
has a covering generalization that can be backed up; let us call such a backable
covering generalization a ‘valid warrant’. The first question to ask in such an
investigation is whether the generalization is a priori, i.e. capable of being evaluated
by reflection, or a posteriori, i.e. in need of empirical support for its justification. If a
covering generalization proves after appropriate reflection or empirical
2
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investigation to be a valid warrant, the next question to ask is whether some
exceptional circumstance undermines or overrrides its authority in the case under
discussion. The status of a possible warrant as a priori or a posteriori thus seems to
be prior in the process of assessing ground adequacy to its status as conclusive or
defeasible. So we might take the main distinction among valid warrants to be that
between a priori warrants that are self-evident and a posteriori warrants that are
empirically supported. We would then distinguish within each class between
conclusive or exceptionless warrants and defeasible warrants that have exceptions.
3. WHAT TYPES?
Construed as a classification of valid warrants, Freeman’s taxonomy clearly meets
the desiderata of dividing a genus into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
classes. A valid warrant either has universal authority or is subject to exceptions,
but not both. And a valid warrant either can be backed a priori or rests necessarily
on empirical support, but not both.
In my view Freeman has made his case that all four combinations made
possible by his bi-dimensional division are actualized. There are indeed defeasible a
priori valid warrants, i.e. warrants that are self-evident rather than backed by
experience but that have exceptions. Freeman correctly includes in this category
general evaluative propositions (moral, intrinsic, aretaic) that license drawing
evaluative conclusions ceteris paribus from factual premises, as well as warrants for
a priori analogies and for arguments to the best explanation.
There are also conclusive a posteriori valid warrants, of which Freeman gives
perfectly correct examples: universal laws of nature and taxonomic classifications. A
conclusion drawn in accordance with a universal law of nature obviously follows
conclusively from the reasons given. And laws of nature require empirical support
for their justification, whether by Cohen’s canonical tests or in some other way.
Similarly, a well-constructed system of classification licenses a conclusive inference
from belonging to a species to belonging to its genus. And such systems, if they
classify observed entities rather than a priori constructions, require empirical
support, both for identification of salient principles of division and for construction
of the taxonomy once the salient principles are identified. Freeman’s proposed
taxonomy is a case in point.
Two minor caveats. First, it would be better to describe the source of support
required for a posteriori warrants as observation rather than sense experience,
since empirical support is frequently provided, especially in scientific research, by
instruments rather than human senses (Shapere, 1982). Second, the qualification of
conclusive a posteriori warrants by the adjective ‘prima facie’, to indicate that such
warrants may turn out in the light of further experience to have exceptions, is an
unwarranted and confusing introduction of an epistemic factor into an ontically
based taxonomy. In fact, all warrants deserve the same qualification: defeasible a
posteriori warrants are just as subject to revision as conclusive ones in the light of
new experience, and even a priori warrants are subject to revision in the light of
further reflection.
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We inherit from Aristotle’s Topics (I.12) a division of all arguments with
adequately supported conclusions into deductions and inductions. Freeman invites
us instead to think of the two main types as conclusive arguments and defeasible
arguments, each having a priori and a posteriori sub-types. Should we accept the
invitation?
One possible response is to accept the main distinction but use the old labels,
calling any argument with a valid conclusive warrant a deduction and any argument
with a valid defeasible warrant an induction. This response is likely to satisfy
neither traditionalists nor reformers. Traditionalists will object to the reformulation
of well-established concepts, reformers to the misleading character of the old labels.
Compromisers might favour keeping the old labels on the ground that they are well
established in ordinary usage. In fact, however, the old labels are not widely used. In
a Google search of phrases of the form ‘x arguments’, where ‘x’ is an adjective,
‘deductive arguments’ and inductive arguments’ ranked 32 and 33 out of 86, with
frequencies one-tenth or less of the six most common descriptors of arguments.
(Details are available on request from the present author.) And instructors of critical
thinking courses regularly find that students don’t come to their classes already
knowing the distinction between deduction and induction; it has to be taught. We
might as well teach the right distinction with new labels whose meaning is not at
risk of being distorted by the tradition.
Another possible response is to accept the main distinction but question the
need for the subsequent sub-division. We can divide valid warrants, whether
conclusive or defeasible, into those that need empirical support and those that don’t.
But what is the point of doing so? Here Freeman has a good answer. When we ask if
the premises of an argument adequately support its conclusion, we are asking if
some valid warrant licenses the inference. To ask if a covering generalization is a
valid warrant requires looking to see if it is adequately backed. And, since we look
for evidence if it needs empirical support, but reflect if it does not, a first step is to
figure out whether it needs such support or not, i.e. whether it is a posteriori or a
priori.
Another possible response is to propose a further division of defeasible valid
warrants. Toulmin, whose concept of warrant Freeman appropriates, in fact
distinguishes four types of modal qualifiers associated with warrants: necessarily,
probably, presumably, possibly (1958). Defeasible warrants on this account come in
three types: probabilistic, presumptive and possibilistic. On Toulmin’s account,
some warrants license a transition to a guarded commitment to a claim, others to a
presumption in favour of the claim that may be overridden by exception-making
circumstances, still others to the conclusion that a hypothesis is worth further
investigation. Possibilistic warrants in particular deserve attention: much
preliminary argumentation in scientific research, detective work and other fields of
investigation involves determining whether something may be the cause of some
phenomenon or event. As to the difference between probabilistic and presumptive
warrants, there seems intuitively to be a clear difference in kind between using a
statistical syllogism to argue that Tweety, being a bird, probably can fly and using
the Criminal Code of Canada to argue that a person possessing more than an ounce
of cannabis presumably possessed it for the purpose of trafficking. The difference
4
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however is not a matter of whether the classical probability calculus applies; it
applies to neither of these arguments.
On the whole, Freeman’s classification stands up to these possible challenges.
4. SCHEMES: INDUCTION, PROMISES, STATISTICS
In his discussion of more specific types of argument, Freeman makes some claims
that deserve examination: about induction, about the moral obligation to keep
promises, and about statistical inference.
He identifies inductive arguments with defeasible a posteriori arguments, i.e.
non-conclusive arguments whose warrant must be backed by empirical evidence,
ultimately rooted in sense experience. One may question this identification. The
concept of induction was introduced into the western logical tradition by Aristotle,
as argument from particulars to a universal (Topics I.12.105a12). Contemporary
logic textbooks follow Aristotle in regarding generalization from instances as
inductive reasoning. Thus, if any form of argument is inductive, argument from
particulars to a universal is inductive. But valid inductive generalization may be
conclusive. For example, determination in an experiment of the boiling point at
standard atmospheric pressure of a single pure sample of a liquid chemical
compound is conclusive evidence that all samples of that compound boil at that
temperature at standard atmospheric pressure. Further, like argument by analogy,
valid inductive generalization may be a priori, as in the case of Socrates’ argument in
Plato’s Euthyphro from what is true of carrying, leading and seeing to the general
conclusion that
if anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed
because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is
being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is
something affected because it is being affected. (Euthyphro 10c, Grube’s translation)

Thus induction straddles Freeman’s categories.
Freeman endorses Ross’s claim that it is “self-evident ... that to make a
promise ... is to create a moral claim on us in someone else”. However, he rejects the
claim that this principle is analytic, i.e. true in virtue of what it means to make a
promise, on the ground that the principle has exceptions. This position makes
mysterious what sort of a priori intuition is involved in apprehending the truth of
the principle. Further, cases where it is not morally wrong, all things considered, to
break a promise nevertheless involve, as input to deciding what to do, the moral
relevance of having made the promise, which might be explained by the very
meaning of what it is to make a promise—namely, to commit oneself to do what one
promises. Nevertheless, Freeman’s position seems correct. A more telling objection
to the analyticity claim than the possibility of exception-making overriding
circumstances is that there are cases where it is not even morally relevant that one
has made a promise—namely, where the promise is extracted by coercion,
inducement or threat. As to the source of our a priori intuition of the moral
relevance of having made a voluntary promise, it seems to be not merely reflection
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on what it means to make a promise, but attention to the whole practice of promisemaking and promise-keeping, including the fact that a person to whom a promise is
made will generally govern their subsequent actions by the assumption that it will
be kept. It is the practice of promising, and the possible adverse effect on others of
breaking a promise, that makes promises morally relevant, not the meaning of the
word ‘promise’.
Freeman makes a common mistake of treating statistical inferences used to
calculate confidence intervals as inferences from the frequency of some property in
a sample to its frequency in the universe from which the sample was drawn. In fact,
it is an inference in the opposite direction, from the frequency in the universe to the
frequency in a sample. To take an example where the arithmetic is simple enough
for the reader to follow the calculation, if the frequency of a property in a universe is
0.5 and a sample of four is drawn at random from the universe, then the probability
that the sample frequency will be between 0.25 and 0.75 inclusive is 7/8 (87.5%).
This result would be expressed in the typical way of reporting confidence intervals
by saying that, 7 times out of 8, the frequency in the sample will be within 25
percentage points of the frequency in the universe. The result can be arrived at by
noting that there is a chance of 0.54 (1/16) that all four individuals will have the
property and a chance of 0.54 (1/16) that all four will lack it; in the remaining 7/8 of
the cases, either one or two or three will have the property. The reasoning here is
purely mathematical, i.e. a priori, and the inference is conclusive. The figure deduced
depends only on the frequency of the property in the universe and the size of the
sample, assuming (as is never actually the case) that the sample is drawn at random
from the universe.
5. SUMMARY
Freeman’s classification should be construed as a classification of types of ground
adequacy rather than of types of argument. So construed, it does indeed cut nature
at the joints, distinguishing warrants as either conclusive or defeasible and as
backed either a priori or a posteriori. In considering a covering generalization of an
argument, to see whether it validly licenses drawing the conclusion, one should
consider whether it is properly backed, by self-evidence if it is a priori and by
empirical evidence if it is a posteriori. And, if it has exceptions, one should attend to
whether the case at hand is one of them.
Freeman is correct that all four combinations are actualized, and in particular
that there are defeasible a priori warrants and conclusive a posteriori warrants. He
is also correct in holding that some common argument schemes, such as conductive
arguments and arguments by analogy, cut across his distinctions; we should add
inductive generalizations to this list.
There are strong arguments against redefining the deductive-inductive
distinction so as to correspond to the conclusive-defeasible distinction. We should
throw out the old labels and use the new ones. We may need to recognize a
distinction among defeasible warrants between those that make a conclusion
probable, those that establish a presumption, and those that indicate that a
hypothesis is a live possibility worth investigating.
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